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The state of infrastructure and services is widely perceived as a measure of development and a major catalyst for
growth in both developed and developing economies. However, financing, maintaining and replicating existing
infrastructures in areas of need have been mostly ineffective. In view of the widespread failures and poor state of
infrastructure and services, there is a need to review current delivery and procurement frameworks. Given that
sustainable infrastructure is also an essential prerequisite for sustainable development, this paper presents a
polycentric cultural framework for infrastructure and service delivery; a framework which emphasises the integration
of infrastructure users, communities, public and private sectors throughout the process of conceptualisation to actual
delivery of infrastructure, by taking the recipients’ culture, beliefs and values into account. The framework also
emphasises the use of systemic referendum among stakeholders by way of the traditional consultative processes and
the collaborative consensus paradigm to achieve an effective and sustainable delivery of infrastructure and services.
1. Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to present and pioneer an
alternative framework for infrastructure and service delivery
that could generally be applicable to the developed and
developing economies. This is very important in view of the
fact that recent studies have confirmed that human culture is a
vital factor in the delivery of sustainable infrastructure and
services, and also in the assessment of living conditions. The
framework to be presented here is called the polycentric cultural
framework (PCF) for infrastructure and service delivery. This is
a direct response to the call for an alternative framework that
could potentially merge either the public and community-user
provision (here referred to as PUCUP), the private and
community-user provision (PCUP), or the public–private and
community-user provisions (PPCUP) in the delivery of sustain-
able infrastructure and its services (Omoregie and Ehiorobo,
2011) (see Figure 1). In this paper, the PPCUP framework will
be the basis for the PCF model.
Ostrom et al. (1993) viewed infrastructure provision as ‘decisions
made through collective choice mechanisms during the process of
acquiring goods, works and services’. This provision covers: the
types of goods, works and services to be provided; the quantity
supplied, their quality, stability andmaintenance; the arrangements
for their production and financing; and monitoring the perfor-
mance of those who produce them. Thus, it covers the process of
conceptualisation, planning and construction and, by implication,
the whole life cycle of the intended infrastructure. Therefore,
infrastructure provision is a much broader concept than
procurement itself; it actually encompasses procurement (the
process of acquiring goods, works and services).
According to the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law Uncitral (www.lexmercatoria.org), procurement is
the process used for the acquisition of goods, works and
related services (i.e. transport, insurance, installation, training,
maintenance and other similar services) required in the
execution of a project, excluding consultancy services. A clear
understanding of the meaning of works, goods and services
relative to infrastructure procurement is also essential.
Uncitral defined a ‘good’ as an object of any kind or description
either in solid, liquid or gaseous form, including raw materials,
products, equipment, electricity and services required to supply
the goods, so long as the value of such incidental services does
not exceed the value of the goods. ‘Works’ refers to all
construction, reconstruction, demolition, repair or renovation
of buildings, structures, site preparation, excavation, erection,
building, installation of equipment or materials, decoration and
finishing, as well as services incidental to construction such as
drilling, mapping, satellite photography, seismic investigations
and similar services provided pursuant to the procurement
contract, so long as the value of these services does not exceed
that of the construction itself. Services are also defined by the
World Bank Group (2003) and African Development Bank
(1997a) as any object of procurement other than goods or
works. It is also appropriate at this stage to provide a brief
Municipal Engineer
Volume 165 Issue ME1
Culture in sustainable infrastructure: the
polycentric cultural framework model
Omoregie
Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers
Municipal Engineer 165 March 2012 Issue ME1
Pages 31–41 http://dx.doi.org/10.1680/muen.2012.165.1.31
Paper 1000028
Received 26/08/2010 Accepted 29/10/2010
Keywords: infrastructure planning/procurement/
sustainability
ice | proceedings ICE Publishing: All rights reserved
31
Downloaded by [ University of Derby] on [17/02/17]. Copyright © ICE Publishing, all rights reserved.
overview of the only widely accepted multi-lateral international
best practice for procurement.
International best practice for procurement as spelled out by
the ‘Uncitral model law’ (UN, 1994) on procurement of goods,
works and services serves as a model for the evaluation and
modernisation of procurement laws and practices, and the
setting out of procurement legislation where none exists within
member countries of the United Nations. This model legisla-
tion on procurement by Uncitral was a direct response to
outdated and inadequate legislation governing procurement in
member countries, which has resulted in inefficiency, ineffec-
tiveness, abuse and the failure to obtain value in return for the
expenditure of public funds. Thus, the reform of the procedure
and practices of the public procurement system is the
foundation for the application of the ‘model law’ (see the
yearbook of the Uncitral, UN (1994)).
However, the inadvertent disregard for maintenance and
procurement procedures and best practice for procurement
has been identified as one of the root causes of corruption,
infrastructure delay, cost escalation and failures in deve-
loping countries (see http://www.bpp.gov.ng/dyncnt/fileviewer.
php?udsec5docs&fid5Mjk%3D&ft5&tr5DD; Omoregie and
Radford, 2006; Omoregie et al., 2005). This apparent disregard
ignores basic institutional and international principles or
policies that underpin the procurement of works and services.
These basic principles as cited in the yearbook of the Uncitral
(UN, 1994), the World Bank Group (2003) and the African
Development Bank (1997b) include in summary:
& economy and efficiency in the procurement of works, goods
and services
& transparency, accountability, responsibility and objectivity
& equal opportunity aimed at maximising competition
& encouraging indigenous participation.
2. Methodology
The methodological approach employed here was centred on
secondary research: the critical review of existing infrastructure
and service provision models. It involves a critical appraisal of
the Uncitral, which is the basis for international best practice
for procurement; and a brief overview of the Nigerian
procurement system. The methodology also includes the
experience gathered during a primary data collection survey
conducted in Nigeria and concluded in December 2005 to
investigate the state and failures of infrastructure. The
experience gathered during the data collection process can be
found in the Appendix section of this paper, as this is not
directly employed in the analysis.
3. Procurement systems in Nigeria
The modes of procurement commonly used in Nigeria are
competitive tendering and selective tendering (Aniekwu and
Ogunje, 2002; Esenwa, 2004; Mansfield et al., 1994). The
World Bank’s country procurement assessment report
(CPAR) for Nigeria (World Bank, 2000), as cited in
Ekpenkhio (2003), identified these gaps in the country’s
procurement system. As a way of tackling the problems
identified from the study, the following recommendations
were made in the CPAR:
& the need for a procurement law based on Uncitral
& the need to establish the Public Procurement Commission
(PPC) to serve as the regulatory and oversight body on
public sector procurement
& the need for revision of some key areas of financial
regulations in order to make them more transparent
& the streamlining of tender boards and the strengthening of
their functional authority and powers to award contracts
& a critical need to rebuild procurement and financial
management capacity in the public sector
& a comprehensive review of the businesses related to export,
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import and transit regulations, procedures and practices,
including the automated system for customs data
(ASYCUDA).
4. Uncitral
Although the Uncitral model law on procurement of goods,
construction and services is an internationally recognised
model or template for procurement procedures, particularly
in developing economies and multilateral development banks,
there are similar and in some cases enhanced legal frameworks
in regional trade arrangements. Examples are the EU agree-
ment on public procurement directives and World Trade
Organization (WTO) government procurement agreement
(GPA). Despite the fact that these arrangements are plur-
ilateral (non-multilateral instruments), they are binding on
member states within the EU and WTO.
These legal frameworks for procurement procedures outside the
model law are required in order to cater for apparent limitations
and to bridge regional divides in the application dynamics of the
model law. Notable are the recommendations by the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) for a revised model law for ‘cross-
border bidding on a non-discriminatory basis’, electronic
procurement to enhance economy, procedural efficiency, trans-
parency, broader supplier market, possibilities for better monitor-
ing andmore public confidence in the procurement process (http://
www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/commercial_law/
pages/Final_Comments_Uncitral_Model_Law).
As cited in http://adbprocurementforum.net/?p554, Uncitral has
initiated reform to its model law since 2004 in view of the huge
changes and challenges in the ‘business environment’ for
procurement. Further areas identified for amendments in the
revised model law include: suppliers’ lists; framework agreements;
procurement of services; alternative methods of procurement,
evaluation and comparison of tenders; the use of procurement to
promote industrial, social and environmental policies; abnormally
low tenders; remedies and enforcement; community participation
in procurement; simplification and standardisation of the model
law; and legalisation of documents and conflicts of interest.
5. Appraisal of key infrastructure delivery
frameworks
5.1 The public ownership and public operation
framework
In this option, government department and public enterprises
are the most common medium for infrastructure ownership
and operation. Public enterprise is subdivided into four parts:
traditional public enterprise, corporate and commercial public
enterprise, public enterprise with service contracts and public
enterprise with management contracts (World Bank, 1994).
Notable achievements from this framework have been centred
on commercial principles and regulations which give managers
control over operations and freedom from political inter-
ference, while the manager’s accountability is often spelt out in
the performance agreements or the management contracts
(Fischer et al., 2003; IMF, 2005). Thus, subject to similar
constraints as private enterprise, successful public delivery
emerges through competition created by private firms in the
infrastructure market. Successes have been achieved under this
pattern by, for example, the water supply authorities in Togo
and Botswana, highway authorities in Ghana and Sierra Leone
and the restructured road agency in Tanzania (World Bank,
1994).
In contrast, it is argued that successes from this approach on
many occasions are short-lived due to political and social
interference; especially in sub-Saharan Africa (Nwoye, 2002;
World Bank, 1994). Moreover, Ostrom (1996) also criticises
this model by arguing that centralisation of infrastructure and
service delivery at the national level has actually kept
municipalities and citizens from access to decision-making
responsibilities and resources. Ostrom observes that citizens
were themselves helpless to do anything about their squalid
conditions although they possessed skills and time that could
have been applied to the solution of the problems they faced.
However, it is apparent that 100% public sector ownership of
assets means that the huge burden of maintenance, operation,
financing, policy making, planning and risk taking would be
expected to be carried by the public sector alone. Public
provision of social and physical infrastructure has choked the
abilities of several governments in developing economies. For
example, it can be argued that the governments within sub-
Saharan Africa have more to do than they can handle, as they
are in charge of education, defence, telecommunications,
power supply, water supply, sanitation and drainage and
irrigation schemes, with the onus of maintenance and
operations resting solely on their shoulders.
5.2 The public ownership and private operation
framework
This option is characteristically put into practice through lease
and concession contracts by assigning full operation and
maintenance, along with commercial risk and the responsibility
of new investment in publicly owned infrastructure facilities, to
the private sector. Thus, only through concession can the
private operator typically assume all commercial risk of
operation and shares in investment risk. Lease and concessions
are working well for water supply in Guinea and port facilities
in Ghana, and Nigeria is about to apply this option to electric
power supply (http://www.everything-nigeria.com/bbe/blue.
htm; World Bank, 1994). Moreover, leases and concessions
evidently consent to private sector management and financing
without necessarily dismantling existing organisations or
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immediately crafting an exclusively new regulatory framework.
This system of concession is another form of partnership
popularly referred to as public–private partnership (PPP).
This is a partnership between the public and private sectors for
the purpose of design, planning, financing, construction,
ownership and operation of projects which would be regarded
conventionally as falling within the responsibility of the public
sector (Akintoye et al., 2006). PPP involves the sharing of
responsibility between government and the private sector. For
example design, construction, operation, maintenance, finance
and risk management skills are provided by the private sector,
while the government is responsible for strategic planning and
industry structure, obtaining permits, customer interface
issues, regulation, community service obligations and some-
times payment on behalf of the service users (http://www.aph.
gov.au/library). Examples of this partnership are found in the
BOT/BOOT/BOO arrangements described below.
In brief, a build-operate-transfer (BOT) arrangement is one
where a private sector consortium puts up sufficient funds and
builds an infrastructure – such as power supply – whose output
is later sold to a publicly owned infrastructure company of the
same type in the host country for a franchised period of
between 10 and 30 years, before transfer to the host
government for a token (David and Fernando, 1995; Haley,
1992). Nevertheless, a slightly different explanation of BOT
arrangement is given by Tam (1999) and McCarthy and Tiong
(1991): the arrangement grants the franchisee (project sponsor)
the sole right to generate revenue from the infrastructure for a
specified period, having already been responsible for financing,
construction and operation of the facility. After the concession
period, the infrastructure is transferred at no cost to the
franchiser, which is usually the government. Similarly, build-
own-operate-transfer (BOOT) arrangements involve a private
developer financing, building, owning and operating a facility
for a specified contract period. At the end of this period, the
facility is given back to the government (http://www.aph.gov.
au/library; World Bank, 1994). The build-own-operate (BOO)
arrangement is different from the BOT/BOOT arrangement
because the ownership of infrastructure remains in perpetuity
with the private developer (David and Fernando, 1995). This
arrangement subjects the developer to regulatory constraints
on operations and pricing, and significant financial incentives
for capital investment are derived from long-term right of
operation of the facility.
The notable advantages of BOT/BOOT/BOO arrangements
from studies conducted by Tam (1995, 1999) and David and
Fernando (1995) show that the host government need not
spend public funds but still could excel in the provision of
public facilities for its citizens, while the franchisee makes huge
profits from a successful BOT/BOO/BOOT project. This
arrangement is fast becoming the most suitable interface for
mobilising private capital from the developed and developing
countries; while selling production output to a local monopoly
purchaser.
However, research has revealed that the requirements for
effective and efficient delivery using BOT or BOO approaches
are: an experienced, equitable and simple governing body and
structure; honest and incorruptible political regime; an intact
contractual agreement; a structured set of BOT regulations and
legal system; a large and reliable consortium; an experienced
construction organisation; and last (and most important), no
political intervention (David and Fernando, 1995; Tam, 1999).
These factors are not easily achieved, judging by the current
situation in developed and developing economies, most
especially sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the success of these
approaches in the long term appears questionable.
5.3 The private ownership and private operation
framework
This option is known for its simplicity and tendency to flourish
in a more competitive climate. Success stories have been
recorded from most developed and developing countries. For
example, developing countries that have allowed telephone
services and electricity to be competitively provided with little
or no economic regulation beyond that applied to all firms,
have achieved remarkable success (World Bank, 1994).
However, considerable constraints to this model are prevalent
in the developing world, most especially in sub-Saharan Africa.
These include, among others: inappropriate competitive
climate or restructuring for business; practical and statutory
barriers to private entry; and regulatory involvement that is
incapable of protecting the public interest when competitive
discipline is insufficient (World Bank, 1994, 2002, 2004).
5.4 Bottom-up participatory stakeholder framework
Schubeler (1996) and Ogu (2000) have stressed that this ‘bottom-
up’ participatory stakeholder partnership represents the strategy
capable of enlisting the financial, material resources and expertise
of various sectors of the urban community towards the
improvement of the urban environmental infrastructure.
In addition, international organisations such as the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United
Nations Centre for Human Settlement (UNCHS) and UN-
Habitat/UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme)
have subsequently initiated strategies to evolve a participatory
approach to development and management of the urban
environment (Ogu, 2000; UNCH, 2003; UNDP, 1999). One of
these strategies is the sustainable city programme (SCP), which
aims to provide municipal authorities and city stakeholders in
the public, private and community sub-sector with an
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improved capacity for building in the urban environment and
for planning and management.
For example, the sustainable Ibadan City project (SIP) from
SCP took a systematic approach to the mobilisation of a
cross-section of institutions, community, public and private
agencies, non-government organisations (NGOs), profes-
sionals and business groups and multilateral organisations in
Ibadan. Mobilisation activities were initiated to ensure that
these groups or institutions participated in the identification
and prioritisation of environmental problems, formulation of
environmental improvement and development and execution
of such strategies. It also provided an avenue for the building
of partnerships (Ogu, 2000). Thus, the project promoted public
and private sector partnership approaches to the planning and
management of the environment, emphasising the involvement
of communities in planning and management of their environ-
ment, including the identification of environmental problems
and the choice and strategy for environmental development
(Ogu and Ogbuozobe, 2001). In spite of some excellent studies
carried out on the relevance and types of institutions that
underpin effective infrastructure and service delivery, as
discussed above, there are alternative arguments which include
an additional cultural element. For example, Van der Vaeren
(2004) differs completely from the standpoint that the setting
up and managing of the right public institutions is the sole key
to infrastructure development. He argues that cultural factors
are as important as institutional ones – sometimes even more
important. Furthermore, he maintains that the efficiency of
public institutions is dependent on or determined by its
association with existing culture, because these institutions
are run by people even more than by law or regulation.
Furthermore, in sub-Saharan Africa, researchers have shown
that the non-inclusion of cultural factors remains a major
impediment to development, although existing practice
appears effective by western standards.
5.5 Community and users’ framework
This preference appears most relevant for the delivery of
municipal and local services that provide small-scale infra-
structure, such as village feeder roads, water supply, sanitation
and small-scale power generation off the national grid (World
Bank, 1994). When those who contribute towards the cost are
basically the primary beneficiaries, effective and efficient
service is guaranteed. World Bank supported projects have
shown that community self-help schemes should be selected,
designed and implemented locally without outside imposition.
Several authorities have supported this proposition.
This community demand-driven approach with variable levels
of service has been successfully practised in South Africa
(Abbott, 1996). In this model the emphasis is on developing the
community in its widest sense rather than focusing on capacity
building. The central issue is the community’s right to choose,
and this right is not governed solely by the criterion of
affordability alone (Abbott, 1996; World Bank, 1994, 2002). In
this model, services are designed to meet specific needs and
are not related to a structural hierarchy of incremental
improvements with long-term implications (Abbott, 1996).
Therefore, a deeper appreciation of societal reality and the
recognition that it is quite easy to induce societal change by
working through institutional forms like the community is very
important. This could be realised by using provisions with
which the majority of the people are familiar and to which they
can relate. Mabogunje (1994) in his proposal on institutional
reforms for infrastructure provision in urban regeneration has
given birth to several institutional concepts for infrastructure
provision. Chief among these is the co-production concept by
Ostrom (1996).
The co-production concept implies that citizens can play an
active role in producing public goods and services of
consequence to them (Ostrom, 1996). The co-production
model was developed to describe the potential relationships
that could exist between regular producers and clients who
want to be transformed by the service into safer, better
educated, or healthier persons. The realisation is that the
production of a service, as opposed to a good, is difficult
without the active participation of those supposedly receiving
the service (Ostrom, 1996).
However, it has been suggested that the community-user
framework alone is inadequate in view of the fact that its
capacity for mobilisation of financial resources, enabling
technology and high-level technical support and training is
quite incomplete.
6. Comments
From the literature review undertaken, it is evident that most
delivery frameworks and procurement strategies strive for
fairness and an enhanced competitive environment. It is
important to state that this is the preferred system in the
western world. The competitive system creates incentive
mechanisms to spur private contractors in the provision of
infrastructure and services. Ideally, to realise this objective,
there has to be an equal playing field and equal capacity-
building potentials. However, these conditions do not exist in
reality. For example, in many developing economies, the
average contractor lacks the public or governmental support
necessary to consolidate their capital base; financial, material,
human and technological development for medium- to large-
scale projects. This situation poses severe difficulties for
contractors from smaller developing countries with little or
no capacity to compete favourably with international contrac-
tors, even in their home countries. Thus, it could be argued
that competitive frameworks limit capacity building in
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developing economies with obvious implications on national or
public interest. While it is arguable that such frameworks were
non-existent in earlier developmental stages of first world
countries (the same countries now advocating competitive
frameworks to the third world), evidence abounds on
collaborative partnerships in their environments. These facts
are well known and they constrain efforts to galvanise support
and appreciation for the competitive paradigm in the develop-
ing world; just as some are finding it difficult to appreciate
global warming, climate change and even the sustainable
development paradigm. The argument is that these are the
ideological tools of the west or the first world countries to
impede the growth of the third world (http://www.menominee.
edu/sdi/whatis.htm). Therefore, ‘cross-border bidding on a
non-discriminatory basis’ cannot be convincing in the current
world order and thus is difficult to sell as an idea. To some it is
false procurement, unrealistic and unsustainable, especially for
developing economies. Nevertheless, it is generally acceptable
that the sole criterion for business is to make profit. So,
reconciling profit with local demand or community preferences
is arguably the dilemma of contemporary societies; both in the
developed and developing world. Furthermore, as competition
becomes the dominant and ‘almost a sole criterion of service
provision’ only a few exercise the competitive advantage at the
expense of the vast majority. In the UK for instance, it is well
known that the competitive paradigm was brought to the fore
and strengthened during the Margaret Thatcher period, when
private provision was dominant.
In contrast to the competitive paradigm, in traditional African
communities for example, collaborative partnerships, based on
consensus, have been in existence for a very long time. Thus,
the concept of individualism or singularity is alien to the
traditional African system. In this system, ‘whatever happens
to the individual is believed to happen to the whole group and
whatever happens to the whole group happens to the
individual. Therefore the individual can only say: ‘I am
because we are and since we are therefore I am’ (Mbiti,
1990). In the African view, individualism is the genesis of
competition.
However, it is true that developed and developing countries
require effective and efficient procurement systems.
Procurement in most cases accounts for a high percentage of
total expenditure in developing countries; for example 40% in
Malawi and 70% in Uganda; while the global average ranges
from 12 to 20% (Development Assistance Committee, 2005). In
recent years, however, the drive to reform the procurement
system has increased, partly because of requirements set by the
World Bank and other donor organisations as prerequisite for
development support. In addition, the inefficiencies of the
unreformed public procurement systems have become obvious,
particularly when some developing economies still retain the
majority of the procurement system that differed little from
what was in place during colonial times. Therefore, these
current procurement frameworks are non-interactive and have
not evolved sufficiently with the beneficiaries.
So, sustainable and synergistic procurement strategies must
evolve from the people for whom the project is intended. This
is confirmed by Kumaraswamy (1994) as cited in McDermott
(1999) and Rowlinson and McDermott (1999). Therefore,
superimposing procurement strategies or mechanisms on
developed and developing economies is inappropriate. Every
instance of infrastructure and service delivery must bear in
mind the uniqueness of its intended users. Rowlinson and Root
(1997) have emphasised cultural uniqueness in the analysis of
procurement systems. For further information on cultural
relevance see the author’s experience during the fieldwork
exercise in the Appendix to this paper.
7. Recommendation: the polycentric cultural
framework (PCF)
The community-users composition concept is vital to the PCF
proposal. This concept comprises traditional institutions, the
elders, youth, women and NGOs. The community-user
composition indicates the interrelationships among these
stakeholders. The stakeholders are all directly coordinated by
traditional institutions with the assistance of the public sector,
which is also charged with the responsibility of defining
cultural norms, beliefs and values. However, the traditional
institutions (as custodians of culture and traditions, traditional
institutions still play a critical role in the politics of the present
day because they form an enduring part of people’s heritage)
are closely linked with the grassroots and so have an intimate
understanding of people’s problems. On the issue of chiefs,
constitutions and policies in Nigeria for example, Agbese
(2004) viewed the traditional institution as more accessible to
the ordinary people and more relevant to their daily lives,
particularly to those in rural areas. Thus the traditional
institutions are often used for mobilising citizens and for
dissemination of government policies and views. Lawal (1989)
as cited in Agbese (2004) observed that whenever policy
makers are unable to carry the people along with them in their
programmes and fear the consequences of failure, the help of
traditional institutions is usually sought. Miles (1993) and
Ayeni (1985) as cited in Agbese (2004) maintain that the
traditional institutions could encourage community solidarity
and provide administrative capacities in situations where
central government is ineffective, or even where it is
disintegrating. They see traditional custodians as ombudsmen
for communities, which gives them a means by which to voice
concerns about state bureaucracy. The community-user
composition would be responsible for conceptualising the
project, organisation of systemic referendum and procurement
monitoring (see Figure 2 for the community-user composition
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process activities). During conceptualisation, representatives
are to discuss the type of infrastructure that is relevant to them
and how to finance the project, bearing in mind the various
stakeholders. At this stage, the design of the project and a
suitable procurement procedure adaptable to the prevailing
circumstances is discussed. Ownership or ownership structure,
operation and maintenance of the project, bearing in mind the
polycentricism of this model, are also considered. After the
conceptualisation stage, selected options are further subjected
to a systemic referendum. This referendum on the choice of
infrastructure is an opportunity for every adult in the
community, city or state in which the infrastructure would be
located to have a say as to the type of infrastructure that would
be provided to them (see Figure 3 for procurement: concep-
tualisation and systemic referendum activities). Thus, by
consensus, transparency and accountability are strengthened
right from the conceptualisation stage of the project, since the
various representatives or leaders are directly accountable to
the people. It is also the community-users composition that
makes the final choice on the type of infrastructure and service
to be delivered to them. This model has the potential to reduce
cases of misallocated investments considerably.
In the PCF model there is room for independent monitoring
and verification of the procurement, construction, mainte-
nance and operation processes and strategies. Members of this
monitoring team are to be supported by the public and private
sectors. However, the influence of public and private sectors
must not be allowed to exceed finance, maintenance, opera-
tions, design, construction and ownership (see Figure 4 for
extent of public private participation). The monitoring team is
given the responsibility of identifying and verifying areas of
malpractice and of recommending ways of dealing with them.
This type of supportive institutional arrangement could
considerably reduce fraudulent acts and mass corruption
currently being perpetrated (see Figure 5 for the procurement
monitoring framework (PMF)). In PMF, responsibilities for
construction, operations and maintenance are shared polycen-
trically among the community-users, the public and the private
sectors. Therefore, everyone is charged with the responsibility
of maintaining a project, since they have all been part of its
conceptualisation, planning and financing. This addresses the
problem of inadequate maintenance already identified as one
Community-users
composition
Procurement
monitoring
Infrastructure
referendum
Conceptualisation
process
Figure 2. Community-users’ composition process-activities
Type of
infrastructure
Finance
Design
Construction Ownership
Infrastructure/service
conceptualisation
and referendum Operations
Maintenance
Figure 3. Infrastructure/service procurement: conceptualisation
and systemic referendum activities
Maintenance
Finance
Public_private
influence
Design
Construction
Ownership
Operations
Figure 4. Extent public–private participation
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of the major causes of the poor state and failure of
infrastructure. However, the PMF cannot work in isolation
of the processes discussed and identified in Figures 2–5. A
conglomeration of these processes is necessary and this
conglomeration makes up the PCF, as shown in Figure 6.
8. Limitations
However, for effective applicability, this model still requires
further investigation on ways to ease the bottlenecks that are
likely to evolve from the various segments and interfaces in the
PPCUP, as these interfaces are relatively unknown. In
addition, collaborative contracting of ‘our’ in our contempor-
ary societies is also a new paradigm that will require some time.
Finally, the only identifiable limitation in the methodology is
the localised nature of field work, which is typical of all surveys
and case studies.
9. Conclusion
The identification of the unique position of culture in
sustainable infrastructure and service delivery also defines a
unique role for the community-users structure; the community-
users would after all be the best custodians of their respective
cultures, beliefs and value systems. They should identify the
desired type of infrastructure, quantity, quality, finance
strategy, design, construction, ownership, operation and main-
tenance, and determine the best match between these criteria
and what is available. Thus, they partake in managing its risks
and opportunities and eventually become major stakeholders in
the project. However, bearing the financial burdens would
require support through collaborative partnership with other
stakeholders like the public and private sectors. Thus, the
culture of collaboration across stakeholders as opposed to
competition becomes a major characteristic in the delivery of
sustainable infrastructure and services. In most cases, competi-
tion restricts ideas, raises apprehensions and stagnates creativ-
ity, and in other cases stagnates intellectual harmonisation.
Collaborative partnership among stakeholders could also give
birth to collaborative procurement among contractors. In a
collaborative structure, there are huge expectations for con-
sensus building in decision making to incorporate the wishes of
all parties – the strong and the weak, the majority and even the
minority. Invariably, the general will of the people is reflected on
what and how to provide infrastructure and services that would
be of necessity to them. This presents a sharp contrast to the
theory of competitive understanding and competitive percep-
tions, which consistently sideline the frail, the weak and
Community-users
composition
Procurement
monitoring
Operations MaintenanceConstruction
Public sector Private sector
Figure 5. Procurement monitoring framework (PMF)
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Figure 6. Polycentric cultural framework (PCF)
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minorities in collective decision making. This is a situation that
could easily engender dissatisfaction and disaffection within
society and procurement processes. Further, a collaborative
consensus paradigm guarantees more meaningful participation
in collective decision making (through emphasis placed on
extensive discussions and deliberations on public issues) than the
orthodox contemporary Anglo-Saxon competitive structure.
Thus, extensive debates and discussions usually become
prerequisites for sustainable resolution and provision until
consensus is realised. This process is the foundation of the PCF
model. This model is particularly relevant to the developing
world, most especially sub-Saharan African communities, which
have traditionally subsisted for centuries on the philosophy of
collaborative realities.
Appendix: Challenges encountered during
field work
The first challenge encountered in this study was in the north-
western geopolitical region, where prospective respondents were
initially very reluctant to communicate with the research data
collection team. However, this attitude was eventually overcome
because some members of the team understood the people, their
culture, religion and language.
Another notable experience was at St Saviours Road in Benin
City, in Nigeria’s South-southernzone. The team observed a
scene along a failed portion of this road frequently used by taxi
motorcyclists (scooter drivers). This road was in a state of utter
disrepair and the team decided to photograph it before trying to
find a way around it. This part of the road was seriously
waterlogged and could not be traversed by four-wheeled motor
vehicles. The scooter riders were making a lucrative income by
transporting people across the failed section. So, some of the
scooter riders objected vehemently to the photographs being
taken, also demanding to know why they were being taken.
They damaged one of the cameras beyond repair and seized the
other. They were of the view that members of the team were
journalists out to report their activities on the failed part of the
road.
The seized cameras were later released after the scooter riders
were convinced that the team was made up of students and that
the information collected was purely for research. Some of the
scooter riders confided to the team that their means of
sustenance depended on failed infrastructure, such as that
section of St Saviours Road, in order to survive the prevalent
poverty and unemployment. It was learnt that similar activities
take place in other parts of the city such as the Ugbowo, Upper
Mission and Okhoro areas and the Ogida and Uselu quarters,
particularly during the rainy season.
This scenario could be attributed to the severity of income
disparity and unemployment in the area that forced some people
to take advantage of failed structures like the one at St Saviours
Road in order to survive. It was not surprising to find the scooter
drivers apparently ready to fight anyone that could compromise
their only means of sustenance. This is anecdotal evidence of the
degree to which failed infrastructure can affect the thinking and
behaviour of the poor.
Another interesting incident during the field work occurred in
Imo State in the south-eastern zone of Nigeria, where some
individuals purporting to be local council personnel forbade the
team from taking photographs in a certain town. Nonetheless,
the level of decay of infrastructure in this part of the country
was the worst experienced in the survey, at least as far as the
survey team observed. There were initial difficulties in data
collection in the town, as the response rate was extremely low
(less than 10%). Potential respondents were very unwilling to
return their questionnaires, which resulted in the extension of
the team’s stay there by 3 days.
However, a similar technique used by the team in Kano State in
the north-western region produced the response that the team
wanted and needed. It was observed that the people of this
region responded quickly to anyone who could speak their
language and understand their way of life. This was unlike Imo
State, where even the most literate and enlightened of the people
were apprehensive. While some respondents in this region
demanded remuneration for the return of the questionnaire
during the first data collection exercise, these same people
became very accommodating during the follow-up. Their
cooperation must have been due to the technique of bridging
the communication gap by using their language, culture and
value system. However, extreme care was taken by the team not
to interfere with the responses to the questionnaire.
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editor at journals@ice.org.uk. Your contribution will be
forwarded to the author(s) for a reply and, if considered
appropriate by the editorial panel, will be published as
discussion in a future issue of the journal.
Proceedings journals rely entirely on contributions sent in
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dents. Papers should be 2000–5000 words long (briefing
papers should be 1000–2000 words long), with adequate
illustrations and references. You can submit your paper
online via www.icevirtuallibrary.com/content/journals,
where you will also find detailed author guidelines.
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